Some conclusions, however, I find just puzzling. Here is one example from Chapter 1. On the one hand, Noë tells us that
“Consciousness is more like dancing than it is like digestion” (p. xii).
“The phenomenon of consciousness … is a world-involving dynamic process (p. xiii).
“we should be thinking about [consciousness] as something we do, as a kind of living activity” (p. 7)
On the other hand, after describing a patient in an apparent permanent vegetative state, he writes,
“Obviously, the mere absence of the normal behavioral markers of consciousness does not entail the absence of consciousness” (p. 15).
The tension, to my mind, lies in his saying, essentially, that consciousness is a kind of bodily activity, but that it does not require bodily activity. How can Noë reconcile this idea of consciousness being constituted by bodily activity with his claim that behavior is a “marker” of consciousness? I'm kind of scratching my head about this one.