tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3747825580007273569.post6697841974713258132..comments2023-04-11T01:11:04.984-07:00Comments on The Extended Cognition Blog: That wouldn't be a very interesting experimentKris Rhodeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15340539700756639797noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3747825580007273569.post-55464087191601686592010-01-27T10:21:19.725-08:002010-01-27T10:21:19.725-08:00Kris,
I think you might be leaving something out ...Kris,<br /><br />I think you might be leaving something out of the dialectic here. Recal that C&C say the following:<br /><br />For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin (C&C, 1998, p. 13).<br /><br />There are other comments like that as well. So, pointing out differences between Inga and Otto, as A&A and Rupert do, are direct challenges to the foregoing.<br /><br />Now, one can try to argue as well that Otto's notebook is not a memory at all. One reasonable way to do this would be to pile on lots and lots of differences. Maybe the lack of Miller's magic number 7 wouldn't make Otto's notebook not a memory store, but when you pile on lots and lots of differences that scientists care about -- and all you can say they have in common is something like "same functional poise" whatever that is -- then you at least have some sense to the claim that Otto's notebook is not a memory store by scientific lights. <br /><br />You can say that it is, just like you can say that a computer has memory, but that's not much of an important philosophical or scientific point.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08539727534751588479noreply@blogger.com